Montana Court Denies Bid to Rehear Decision to Transfer IEEPA Case to CIT
The U.S. District Court for the District of Montana rejected four members of the Blackfeet Nation tribe's bid to get the Montana court to reconsider its decision to transfer a challenge to tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to the Court of International Trade. Judge Dana Christensen said that now that the trade court has made an "express finding of its own jurisdiction," when it vacated the executive orders imposed by President Donald Trump implementing tariffs under IEEPA, "the Court concludes that transfer remains the appropriate action" (Susan Webber v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, D.Mont. # 4:25-00026).
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The Blackfeet Nation members brought a suit in April to challenge the IEEPA tariffs on Canada and Trump's expansion of the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada, alleging that Trump exceeded his authority in imposing the tariffs and that the tribal members are entitled to duty-free treatment for their imports under the Jay Treaty (see 2504100039). The Montana court sent the case to CIT, highlighting two cases establishing the trade court's exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of the Trading With the Enemy Act, IEEPA's predecessor, given that IEEPA has the "same operative language as that contained in the TWEA" (see 2504250063).
Since that ruling, the Blackfeet Nation members filed for reconsideration and appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, and the trade court ruled that it has exlcusive jurisdiction under Section 1581(i) to hear challenges to IEEPA tariffs (see 2505280068). Conversely, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia said CIT doesn't have exclusive jurisdiction, since Section 1581(i) says CIT only has exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of U.S. laws providing for tariffs, and IEEPA doesn't provide for tariffs (see 2505290037).
Acknowleding this split, Christensen sided with CIT, finding that since the trade court has expressly found it has exclusive jurisdiction, transfer remains appropriate. “Consolidating matters with the CIT is particularly important to help ensure a necessary 'degree of uniformity and consistency' throughout the United States on the issue of the President’s tariffs imposed under the IEEPA," the judge said.
In vying for reconsideration, the Blackfeet Nation members argued for the first time that the Montana court has exclusive jurisdiction over Indian tribes under the Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause and that CIT doesn't have authority over tribal commerce. While saying the plaintiffs shouldn't have raised the issues for the first time at this stage, the judge addressed the arguments out of an "abudance of caution."
Christensen said the Montana court doesn't have "exlcusive" jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes under 28 U.S.C. Section 1362, since this statute gives district courts jurisdiction in all civil cases brought by Indian tribes. As the government observes, this law only applies to tribes and not "individual Indians." It's also unlikely Section 1362 "would override Section 1581(i)'s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CIT," the judge added.
The Montana court also said the "inclusion of a constitutional claim does not preclude the CIT from exercising its otherwise lawful jurisdiction," and that, at its core, the Blackfeet Nation members' case "challenges a Presidential action imposing duties, tariffs, or other import restrictions on a foreign nation under the IEEPA and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act." As previously found, these challenges "fall within Section 1581(i)’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction."