CIT Says Commerce Failed to Analyze If Calcium Glycinate Is a Form of Crude Glycine

Laroski also held that Commerce "unreasonably" failed to analyze whether the calcium glycinate is a form of crude or technical glycine, notwithstanding its finding that the merchandise under review is a precursor of dried crystalline glycine.

Petitioner Deer Park Glycine asked Commerce to analyze whether glycine glycinate is covered by the AD orders on glycine from India, Japan and Thailand and CVD orders on glycine from India and China. The agency centered its analysis on the second sentence of the orders' scope, which says subject merchandise includes "glycine and precursors of dried crystalline glycine that are processed in a third country."

The agency first noted that the scope doesn't include inputs or precursors used in the production of glycine. The agency heavily referenced a report from chemical engineer Steve Outlaw that outlined the process for making glycine.

Outlaw said making glycine from calcium glycinate requires that the glycinate first be dissolved in water. From there, the solution is treated with sulfuric acid to form glycine, which remains in solution. The calcium sulfate is then filtered from the solution. The remaining filtrate is crystallized to "recover the glycine as wet cake and dried." Outlaw said the manufacturing equipment used to make glycine from monochloroacetic acid and sodium glycinate is the same as that used to make glycine from calcium glycinate.

Commerce ultimately said the glycinate is a "non-scope input used in the production of glycine slurry and glycine slurry is a precursor of dried crystalline glycine." The glycinate is excluded from the orders as a non-scope input or precursor, because it requires multiple production processes to be processed first into a glycine slurry. Since the slurry is then made into dried crystalline glycine, the glycinate isn't a precursor of dried crystalline glycine, Commerce said.

Laroski said this analysis falters on multiple fronts, the first of which is that the agency unreasonably failed to analyze whether the merchandise is a form of crude or technical glycine. The judge said Commerce focused too intently on whether the glycinate is a precursor of dried crystalline glycine and less on the first sentence of the scope, which says the orders cover "glycine of all purity levels, which covers all forms of crude or technical glycine."

The court said that Commerce "glaringly" skipped this sentence, "[o]ddly" quoting this language then setting it aside "to focus on how glycine slurry is a precursor to dried crystalline glycine. That was unreasonable." The agency failed to address "several interpretive questions," including what constitutes "crude or technical glycine," the nature of "sodium glycinate" and the meaning of "all other forms of amino acetic acid," among others, the court said. Commerce must address these questions "in no small part because this part of the written description appears to be phrased quite broadly," the opinion said.

Laroski next faulted Commerce for failing to consider information in the scope ruling application and an ITC report on the orders. The agency offered no reasoning to support its interpretation of Deer Park's application, which said that a glycine precursor can't be glycine. The judge said Commerce "paradoxically" relied on Deer Park's characterization of calcium glycinate as a glycine precursor "in finding that calcium glycinate is not a precursor of dried crystalline glycine within the terms of the Orders."

The court said Commerce unreasonably disregarded much of the ITC report. Even "if one charitably assumes" the agency focused on glycine slurry here "because it is the intermediate link in the production process between glycinate and dried crystalline glycine," the ITC report "raises important questions that Commerce ignored," the court said. "Perhaps most notably: If sodium glycinate is also a precursor to dried crystalline glycine, how does that substance compare with glycine slurry and calcium glycinate?"

The agency can't "disregard entire swaths of record evidence and simply pluck the isolated tidbits that it prefers," Laroski said.

Laroski also faulted Commerce for its treatment of various (k)(1) sources submitted by Deer Park, including dictionary definitions of the term "precursor" and the ITC report. The judge objected to the government's position that the petitioner was required to exhaust its administrative remedies for these sources. The judge said it's "somewhat bizarre" to claim that citations to basic dictionary definitions and the same source used by Commerce "represent post hoc rationalizations or unfair surprises."

The government's logic "implies that in analyzing scope language and record evidence, Commerce need only read the Application, sprinkle in its preferred citations, state its preferred conclusions, and call it a day," the court said. The government's "muddled exhaustion-waiver argument fails to justify Commerce’s refusal to independently consult dictionaries and insightful information in the Commission Report," Laroski said. "Ironically, this argument underscores Commerce’s failures."

(Deer Park Glycine v. United States, Slip Op. 25-38, CIT # 23-00238, dated 04/10/25; Judge: Joseph Laroski; Attorneys: Meixuan (Michelle) Li of Thompson Hine for plaintiff Deer Park Glycine; Claudia Burke for defendant U.S. government)