Exporter Says AD Order Plainly Doesn't Cover Non-Wooden Cabinets and Vanities
The Commerce Department illicitly expanded the scope of the antidumping duty order on wooden cabinets and vanities from China to cover goods made out of phragmites, exporter Nanjing Kaylang Co. argued in an Aug. 27 motion for judgment at the Court of International Trade. The suit challenges Commerce's scope ruling including Kaylang's goods in the AD order (see 2402210053) (Nanjing Kaylang Co. v. United States, CIT # 24-00045).
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Central to Kaylang's claim is that Commerce explicitly said during the scope ruling that "phragmite is not wood." Despite this finding, Commerce held that the phragmite, which is a reed grass, undergoes a manufacturing process "that is very similar to the process used to make particle boards," leading to the production of a phragmite particle board, "a ligneous board of a woody nature."
Kaylang argued that the scope of the order "unambiguously only covers articles of wood," and that even after granting "substantial deference," the scope language plainly only leads to the singular conclusion that non-wood items can't be covered by the order.
The order's scope says that the goods subject to the order consist of "wooden cabinets and vanities," that "are made substantially of wood products, including solid wood and engineered wood products (including those made from wood particles, fibers, or other wooden materials such as plywood, strand board, block board, particle board, or fiberboard), or bamboo." Bamboo is listed as the only alternative material covered by the order, Kaylang argued.
"In other words, every sentence of the scope expressly references wood or is characterized by the word wood or is another expressed material," the brief said. "There is no rational or reasonable interpretation that the scope includes materials not made of wood." If other materials were to be covered by the order, they would be listed in the scope. "They were not," the company argued, making this proceeding "a simple case."