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Think tanks play an increasingly important role in China’s official policy formulation on domestic and global issues. They also communicate these policies to audiences at home and abroad. Nis Grunberg and Grzegorz (Greg) Stec explain how, under Xi Jinping’s rule, the party state has been pushing to more closely align the activities of think tanks with political goals. Research for this report was supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung. A summary: 🔸Room for truly independent think tanks has become negligible, and even private think tanks are under political supervision. They are struggling to navigate a quickly closing space for critical debates. 🔸This affects foreign actors: Chinese think tanks are internationalizing, engaging with global policy debates abroad. Party-state proximity means they often become authoritarian narrators, taking Beijing’s messages to non-state fora or to track 1.5 exchanges. 🔸Think tankers are tasked to exert more influence; at the same time, they are being limited by growing narrative rigidity and red tape when engaging partners abroad. 🔸On the other hand, direct lines of communication with Chinese think tanks allow for more exchanges outside of official diplomatic channels, which is helpful to keep conversations going even at times of conflict. Read the report “Whispering advice, roaring praises: The role of Chinese think tanks under Xi Jinping” on our website: https://lnkd.in/ecKfTWHE

Derek Grossman Ian Bremmer So I've noticed that CSIS is doing something useful and talking about China policy. The big thing about US foreign policy is that neither Harris or Trump are talking about foreign policy on the campaign trail, because *both* Harris and Trump are looking at internal civil wars if they win. One thing that is clear is that the "rules based international order", "pivot to Asia" and the "Indo-Pacific strategy" is dead. As long as American made bombs are blowing up civilian apartments in Lebanon, no one is going to take US complaints about PRC wargames or coast guard ships bumping other ships in the SCS seriously, and the US is going to be in a world of hurt if it mentions the *g*-word against China while people are being starved in Gaza. It's pretty obvious now that the US has absolutely no interest in "rules" when its vital interests are being threatened, and so that effort to create an anti-China framework is dead, dead, dead. And then you have the fact that the Russians are about to win in Ukraine. So Europe has to figure out what to do with Russia, and trying to convince Finland get involved in the South China Seas and Taiwan dispute seems a bit silly. I mean if Putin really wants to conquer Europe, then it seems a big crazy to have Finland do stuff half way around the world. Okay thats done. But what happens next. We will have a better idea after the elections, but whoever wins is going to have to deal with a monster fight. If Harris wins, the pro-Palestine and pro-Israel factions of the Democratic Party are going to end their truce and start fighting each other. On the Republican side, there is going to be a monster fight between JDVance isolationists and the "kiss Russia, kill China" faction (Mike Pompeo, and the neocons). I think the "kiss Russia, kill China" group is going to be for a rude shock when they try to convince Putin to stab China in the back, because Putin doesn't trust the US. The other thing is that all of the people in the foreign policy establishment are going to be jockeying for jobs and positions. So its kind of amusing to watch people essentially put out their resumes. Also the problem is not China-policy, the problem is that the US has no idea what it's foreign policy is, and it's going to be fun to watch people figure this out.

A potential second Trump presidency, particularly given his 34 felony convictions, could significantly destabilise the international stage. Sources suggest heightened global uncertainty due to his perceived unpredictable foreign policy. Key alliances like NATO could weaken further, as international leaders grapple with a US president facing serious legal challenges. This uncertainty might embolden countries like Russia and China, potentially escalating geopolitical tensions and conflicts. Furthermore, a decline in US soft power is anticipated, as Trump’s legal situation and leadership style potentially embolden authoritarian regimes globally. This could jeopardise international security and cooperation, weakening institutions like the UN and efforts to uphold democratic norms.

Chinese think tanks have become increasingly important to party-state policy making and promotion. Our experts Nis Grunberg and Grzegorz (Greg) Stec analyzed the different types of Chinese think tanks and their role in the party state in a recent report supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.  Why it matters: 🔸Think tanks play an increasingly important role in official policy formulation on domestic and global policy issues. 🔸Equally significant is the role of think tanks in communicating policies to audiences at home and abroad. 🔸Think tanks also play an important role as a channel for unofficial exchanges with foreign partners and it has become more important to understand their role in political communication. Key findings:    🔸The Xi administration has been pushing to closer align think tank’ activities with political agendas and maximize their research utility for the party-state. 🔸Room for truly independent think tanks has become negligible. Even private think tanks are under political supervision. 🔸Chinese think tanks are increasingly engaging with global policy debates abroad. Party-state proximity means they often become authoritarian narrators. 🔸On the other hand, direct lines of communication with Chinese think tanks allow for more exchanges outside of official diplomatic channels, which is helpful to keep conversations going even at times of conflict. You can read the full report, including case studies of four think tank archetypes, as a pdf below or on our website: https://lnkd.in/ecKfTWHE  

Happy to share with you my latest analysis examining what will likely be the main focus points in the inauguration speech of incoming Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te. New Taiwan president to set tone for ties with China at inauguration Taiwan's incoming president, Lai Ching-te, will have the world's attention when he delivers his inaugural address on Monday. All ears will be on Lai’s language and framing of his administration as officials in Beijing, Washington, Tokyo and elsewhere scrutinize every word on cross-strait relations, particularly those that could suggest a departure from an already precarious status quo. Special focus will be on how the 64-year-old, who once described himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence,” refers to the democratic island, how he talks about its autonomy and on which level he will try to navigate relations with Beijing amid a heightened risk of conflict. Currently vice president, Lai will be taking the reins from President Tsai Ing-wen after winning a hotly contested election in January that was largely framed as a choice between change and continuity. His victory — and that of running mate Hsiao Bi-khim — made the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) the first in the self-ruled island’s history to win three straight presidential terms, a vote of confidence for a party that has long emphasized that Taiwan is already a de facto sovereign nation. China, which views it as a breakaway province, has not ruled out seizing the island by force despite growing indications that the United States and its allies may be willing to defend it — a situation that has turned Taiwan into one of the most worrisome flashpoints in the region. Lai is well aware of this, which is why he is likely to strike a conciliatory tone in his address. The DPP leader will try to lower tensions by sending a “goodwill” message to Beijing in an attempt to “strengthen dialogue and reduce the spiral of hostility,” Taiwan's Central News Agency reported this week. Click here to read the full analysis https://lnkd.in/d6thkbCV

A political cliche of the moment is that one thing both main parties in the US agree on is China. But how real is this so-called 'Washington consensus', and to what extent are foreign policy experts feeling pressure to 'hawkflate' their views on relations with Beijing? Eliot Chen has looked into some interesting new research on such questions, and why this matters beyond the China-watching community.

The lessons from Southeast Asia's long history of navigating Great Power contests are seared into the local DNA. The challenge for the US and China in their tussle for greater influence in the Indo-Pacific is to understand the motivations of Southeast Asian states and what these smaller states in the region, a geostrategic chokepoint and major trade route, are willing or unwilling to do. Getting Southeast Asia right means understanding the region’s commonsensical approach toward statecraft: a policy of strategic diversification that minimizes its vulnerability to vassalage, writes Chin-Hao Huang, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy's co-chair of international affairs: https://buff.ly/3Wpqf61

An excellent read by Jisi Wang, @Hu Ran, and @Zhao Jianwei whom are all highly accomplished and respected at home and abroad related to how #China sees #US #foreignpolicy under either a #harris or #trump administration. A couple quibbles: 1) The authors solely focus on internal US politics as for the reason of changes in US policy towards China without acknowledging China's behaviour and changes under #xijinping 2) Would China give three prominant scholars the same opportunity to write in a magazine open to all of China about its political leaders? https://lnkd.in/gPjai__F

Excellent coverage by Eliot Chen here. It's good to ask these questions. But it's also right to ask what the "Pressure Paper" does not include. Of key note, concern in the US about #China did not arise spontaneously--rather, it is a product of many years of the Chinese Communist Party's increasingly aggressive actions. Maritime intrusions against Japan and Philippines, unsafe air intercepts, rampant cyber attacks, hostage taking (the Two Michaels), live fire exercises ringing Taiwan, constant air & sea pressure ops against Taiwan, Little Blue Men,  balloon flights over US,  all types of corrosive trade behavior, super scale industrial espionage, concentration camps in Xinjiang, coercive envelopment of Hong Kong, and more.  Seeing these behaviors as threats that need to be taken on is an entirely reasonable response. There are real debates on China-related questions--read Foreign Affairs Magazine and Foreign Policy and they jump right out. The "groupthink" thesis glosses over reality. Would be good to see some real deal pollsters turned loose with their surveys on these questions. Shannon Brandao Andrew Erickson Rush Doshi Isaac "Ike" Harris