CIT Keeps Suit Alive Suit Under 1581(i) on Decision Not to Open CCR
Importer Houston Shutters properly filed suit under Section 1581(i), the Court of International Trade's "residual" jurisdiction, in its case on the Commerce Department's decision not to initiate a changed circumstances review regarding whether wood shutter parts were within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on Chinese millwork products, CIT held on Jan. 29. Concurrently, the court dismissed a separate but identical suit from Houston Shutters filed under Section 1581(c).
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Judge Leo Gordon held that Houston Shtutters "has alleged facts that reveal new information not available at the time of the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations," meaning the importer couldn't have raised its claims during the investigations.
Houston Shutters filed the pair of lawsuits last year to contest Commerce's decision not to open a changed circumstances review. During the investigations, exporter Lanzhou Xinyoulian Industrial Co. asked the agency to exclude wood shutter components from the scope of the AD/CVD orders, but failed to follow up and provide Commerce with the information the agency had requested. Following the investigations, Houston Shutters sought the changed circumstances review for the same reasons, this time offering the information Commerce had asked for. The agency denied the request, and Houston Shutters filed suit.
The U.S. moved to dismiss the importer's 1581(i) lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the "true nature" of the importer's case is a challenge to the underlying investigations (see 2501220090).
Gordon rejected this premise, writing that the U.S. "problematically" fails to show how the court can identify the true nature of the case "based on the factual allegations provided by" Houston Shutters. The judge faulted the government for leaving it to the court to "determine which jurisdictional facts are at issue and to dig through the administrative record, unguided."
The U.S. argued that the "true nature" of the case isn't a challenge to Commerce's refusal to open a changed circumstances review, but rather to the agency's scope determination in the investigations. The government relied on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's decision in Sunpreme v. U.S. for the proposition that a "party may not expand a court's jurisdiction by creative pleading."
Gordon agreed with Houston Shutters that Sunpreme is distinct from the present case, since Houston Shutters' case is predicated on new information that wasn't available during the investigations. "The new information not available during the investigation directly relates to whether Commerce should have initiated a CCR, which in turn directly goes to Plaintiff’s alleged basis for jurisdiction under § 1581(i)," the judge said.
The court held that the government failed to explain how the court "can disregard Plaintiff’s allegations regarding factual information that arose after the investigation in support of its changed circumstances review."
The U.S. submitted a "confidential appendix with over 500 pages of record information pertaining to the underlying investigation and determination not to initiate a CCR" that it claims lets the court conclude that Houston Shutters "is simply seeking to relitigate the scope determinations made during the investigations." Gordon found the government's failure to "identify precisely which 'jurisdictional facts' it is contesting" to be deadly to its case.
The judge added that the court engaged with the government's counsel in a "lengthy colloquy" at oral argument to "attempt to determine workable guidelines or standards that could be applied in making such a determination at the motion to dismiss stage." While the arguing attorney initially suggested the court could base its finding on the nature of the "relief" requested, Gordon said the court's "subsequent discussion with counsel resulted in the apparent recognition by Defendant that a relief-focused analysis could not be feasibly applied, especially as potential plaintiffs may adjust their requested relief in their proposed complaints to secure jurisdiction."
As a result, the government is "unable to persuade the court that the type of searching 'true nature' inquiry" applied in such cases as Sunpreme "warrants dismissal here," the court held. Gordon concluded by noting that just because Houston Shutters "has pled sufficient information to meet the plausibility standard does not mean that Plaintiff will prevail on the merits."
(Houston Shutters v. United States, Slip Op. 26-7, CIT # 24-00193, dated 01/29/26; Judge: Leo Gordon; Attorneys: Jordan Kahn of Grunfeld Desiderio for plaintiff Houston Shutters; Emma Bond for defendant U.S. government)