Millwork Importer Says CAFC Precedent Supports CIT Jurisdiction Over Case
Defending against a motion to dismiss its Section 1581(i) case challenging the Commerce Department’s refusal to open a changed circumstances review, wood mouldings and millwork importer Houston Shutters said that precedent actually supports its case (Houston Shutters v. United States, CIT # 24-00193).
Sign up for a free preview to unlock the rest of this article
Timely, relevant coverage of court proceedings and agency rulings involving tariffs, classification, valuation, origin and antidumping and countervailing duties. Each day, Trade Law Daily subscribers receive a daily headline email, in-depth PDF edition and access to all relevant documents via our trade law source document library and website.
The U.S. argued in its motion to dismiss that Houston Shutters could have brought its case under Section 1581(c), preventing a Section 1581(i) jurisdiction claim (see 2501220090 and 2506160028). It cited the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case Trustees in Bankruptcy of North American Rubber Thread Co. v. United States, which also involved Commerce declining to initiate a changed circumstances review after an antidumping duty investigation respondent went bankrupt and, in agreement with the investigation’s petitioner, asked for an earlier revocation date for the AD order. The respondent failed, CAFC holding it could have filed under 1581(c).
But the respondent, Heveafil, lost because it already had participated in a prior changed circumstances review and had brought a different trade court case challenging that review’s results, Houston Shutters argued. That was distinguishable from the case at bar now, it said.
The importer claimed its situation was more akin to that of another party in Trustees: the petitioner, North American Rubber Thread, which also sued Commerce to have the order’s revocation date moved up. CAFC ruled that the petitioner could bring its suit under 1581(i), it pointed out.
“Defendant’s strained analogy to Heveafil rests on the view that Plaintiff ‘had an alternate remedy to achieve the same ultimate outcome in this case,’” it said. “Plaintiff could not in the investigations achieve the fundamentally dissimilar relief of a post-order scope exclusion, let alone based on ample new information presented.”