Responding to Catalyst Block Importer, US Says Commerce Didn’t Misinterpret CAFC GRI Holding
The U.S. said Feb. 7 that importer Mitsubishi’s catalyst blocks were actually filters, despite the importer’s arguments otherwise, and thus was properly classified under Harmonized Tariff Schedule heading 8421 and assessed Section 301 tariffs (Mitsubishi Power Americas v. United States, CIT # 21-00573).
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The classification dispute turns on whether Mitsibushi’s products, which chemically convert nitrous oxide from industrial pollutant emitters into nitrogen and water, are “filters” or “purifiers” (see 2408230019 and 2501210057). The importer argues the products instead fall under HTS heading 3815 for “reaction initiators, reaction accelerators and catalytic preparations, not elsewhere specified or included,” excluded from Section 301 duties.
The importer and the U.S. also disagreed on the application of HTS’ General Rules of Interpretation to Mitsubishi’s selective catalytic reduction (SCR) blocks. Mitsubishi accused the government of misrepresenting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision in Home Depot U.S.A. v. United States; it said the U.S. cited the case to make the argument that “GRI 1 applies, and the succeeding GRIs are inoperative, when an article is covered in whole by a single classification heading, and that GRI 3 only applies when goods are prima facie classifiable under two or more headings” (see 2412190071), but claimed CAFC only made that statement when describing a Court of International Trade holding it was overruling.
The U.S. disagreed in its Feb. 7 brief that its analysis of the CAFC decision was flawed. That court, “as reflected by the decision itself,” followed precedent “by directly quoting to Camelback for the well-established premise” that when an import is completely described by an HTS heading, the no interpretation rules apply after the first one, it claimed.
Even if Mitsubishi’s products weren’t completely described by one heading, GRI 3(a), which requires classification under the “most specific” heading, still took precedence over the importer’s citation to GRI 3(b), the government said. Instead, it said, the importer “jumps straight to GRI 3(b)” to claim that the blocks should be classified by the component that defines their “essential character.”
The U.S. also argued Mitsubishi’s follow-up brief “introduces a new argument” that its SCR blocks aren’t “apparatus.”
Again, the exporter claimed the U.S. left words out of its direct citations to CIT’s Trijicon v. United States, this time by describing the court’s definition of apparatus as “equipment designed to specifically carry out a particular function.” The importer claimed the court actually said that apparatus are “a set of materials or equipment designed to specifically carry out a particular function,” then further defined an apparatus as “any complex device or machine for a specific use.” The court went on to say that “equipment” required “each individual component … must also serve a particular function,” while several components of Mitsubishi’s products don’t, the importer argued.
The U.S. hit back, calling it “exceedingly compelling” that the blocks’ patents themselves describe the products as “equipment” and “apparatus.” It also said: “Oddly, in its response papers, Plaintiff denies that these patents cover the imported merchandise,” it said. “But this is belied by the record.”
It also said the importer’s own expert described them as “apparatus” and that the products fit all parts of the definition of the term.
And it claimed Mitsubishi was relying “heavily” on its expert analysis, but said again that its expert was putting forward an “erroneous legal analysis of the tariff terms.”
“It is the Court who is charged with interpreting the law and the tariff terms, not the expert witness,” it noted.