Glycine Producer Argues CIT Has Jurisdiction Over Scope Ruling Request Denials

The case asks whether calcium glycinate, a precursor to dried crystalline glycine, is covered by antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders on the latter when imported from India or China. Commerce ruled in 2012 that sodium glycinate, a similar precursor, was covered; but it held in an October 2023 scope ruling that calcium glycinate is too far removed from glycine.

Deer Park said it filed a new scope ruling request the following month, in November, with more evidence: an excerpt from that 2012 scope ruling, evidence showing how sodium glycinate is similar to calcium glycinate, and excerpts from the orders’ petition and other investigation filings. Commerce rejected that request.

The trade court refused to let in Deer Park’s request for the October 2023 scope ruling (see 2406170002).

The U.S. sought to have the case dismissed, arguing that Commerce’s denial of Deer Park’s November scope ruling request isn’t a decision the trade court can hear under section 1581(c), the producer said.

“In other words, Defendant is alleging that only a determination expressly ruling on whether the merchandise at issue is within the scope of the existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders would have been a reviewable determination,” it said.

Calling the government’s interpretation of the statute “narrow,” Deer Park said no support had been provided for the claim. It also argued that the rejection of the November scope ruling request was an implicit affirmation of the October scope ruling, as, by finding the second application duplicative, it was “predicated on its implied intention to treat all calcium glycinate as not in-scope.”

If the court lacks jurisdiction under section 1581(c), it can still hear the case by way of 1581(i) -- which the government has even conceded, Deer Park said. Its “only complaint is that Plaintiff is already seeking an appeal of Commerce's October 2023 Determination” in separate litigation, which could offer an adequate remedy and render this case moot.

But this is “blatantly wrong,” it said. It argued that the remedy it seeks in this action is a reconsideration of its second scope ruling request, which includes additional evidence.

Again, the producer also said that Commerce’s decision to reject its second scope ruling request went against past precedent and the language of the relevant law. The second scope ruling request, it said, corrected the deficiencies that Commerce found in Deer Park’s first request. Under 19 C.F.R. 351.225(d)(1)(i), a scope ruling applicant may “resubmit the full application at any time, with all identified deficiencies corrected,” it said.

It also argued that “nowhere in the rulemaking history” was it considered possible for Commerce to reject a scope ruling application “solely because it is ‘duplicative.’” The only evidence that the U.S. pointed to was statements during the drafting process referencing “a provision that was later removed from the regulatory text,” which “cannot have any evidentiary value,” it said.

Finally, it said that even if the department was allowed to reject scope ruling applications solely because they were duplicative, Commerce’s decision to do so in this case was an abuse of discretion.

The U.S. argued that, if Deer Park won, “an applicant would be able to submit ‘the same application, over and over, without end, and would require Commerce to conduct a new, redundant scope inquiry each time.’”

“Defendant fails to recognize, however, that Plaintiff's second scope ruling application was not the "same" as the initial scope ruling application on which Commerce ruled in October 2023,” Deer Park said.