FCC Eyes Shorter Sub Cable Licenses, a Permanent FM Geotargeting Approval Process
The FCC's proposed rewrite of its submarine cable rules could put a variety of cybersecurity requirements on operators and bar them from using equipment or services on the agency's Covered List. The NPRM on the agency's Nov. 14 open meeting agenda also proposes significantly shortening cable landing licenses, from 25 years to three. Also on the agenda is a codification of many temporary provisions for authorization of geotargeted radio using program-originating FM boosters and a draft order on the caller ID authentication process aimed at further tackling unlawfully spoofed robocalls. The agenda items (see 2410300033) were made public Thursday.
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Under the submarine cable NPRM, cable network operators would have to certify they have cybersecurity risk management plans. The NRPM proposes requiring licensees to provide information to the agency every three years, such as ownership of the licensee and use of foreign-owned managed network service providers. And it asks for input on whether that reporting, plus potentially shortening the 25-year cable license term to three years, would help offer more oversight into national security and law enforcement risks. A shorter license term by itself or with periodic reporting could let the agency assess whether a licensee is complying with rule requirements and whether there are issues "that present national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and/or trade policy concerns," according to the NPRM.
The NPRM also includes a presumption that anyone previously denied international Section 214 authority or who lost domestic or international Section 214 authority because of national security or law enforcement concerns isn't qualified to become a new sub cable landing licensee. And it asks an array of security-related questions, such as what the agency can do to protect submarine cable networks, including steps taken in coordination with other federal agencies.
The FM geotargeting draft order would add notification and public file requirements and reject two petitions for reconsideration against the initial geotargeting order. The petitions, from Press Communications and REC Networks, “repeat arguments the Commission considered and rejected in the First Report and Order,” said an FCC fact sheet on the item.
The draft order would retain the three-minute per hour limit on using FM boosters to originate geotargeted consent, and cap use of such boosters at 25 per station. It would also require that broadcasters notify the FCC they are using the technology, and some broadcasters would also have to notify emergency alerting officials. The order would treat the boosters as individual facilities for the purposes of the agency’s political advertising rules but allow broadcasters to use their main station’s public file for the associated filing requirements. The order would also change the interference rules to include applications to construct FM booster stations among those subject to objections based on predicted interference to another station. Commissioner Geoffrey Starks and Commissioner Brendan Carr vocally supported the previous radio geotargeting order.
The robocalls draft order would define "third-party authentication" and authorize providers to use third parties to sign their calls. It would also make clear that providers must present a service provider code token to a Stir/Shaken certificate authority to obtain a digital certificate.
"Unwanted and illegal calls continue to plague American consumers," the draft order said. The item, if adopted, would establish "clear rules of the road for the use of third parties in the caller ID authentication process" and place "limits to ensure that the party with the implementation obligation under our rules remains responsible and accountable." Providers would also be required to certify their Stir/Shaken implementation status in the robocall mitigation database to obtain a service provider code token and digital certificate and sign all its calls with that certificate.