COAC Subcommittee's Report to DHS on "Secure Systems of International Intermodal Transportation" (Part II)

(In comments regarding the Subcommitte's report on this and other MTSA areas of concern, COAC states that it generally endorses the Subcommittee's recommendations, but does note exceptions and clarifications.)

This is Part II of a multi-part series of summaries of the MTSA Subcommittee's report on its recommendations, and covers a portion of the report in "Deliverable 2: Secure Systems of Intermodal Transportation." See future issues of ITT for additional summaries of this report.

(See ITT's Online Archives or 11/04/04 news, 04110405 for Part I on the report's recommendations for enhancing the in-transit security of containers.)

Improving Automated Targeting and CSI; Criteria for "Green Laned" Cargo, Etc.

The following are recommendations from the MTSA Subcommittee identifying the elements of what should comprise a "secure system of international intermodal transportation," as called for by MTSA. The Subcommittee notes that these elements are presented in a logical, but not necessarily prioritized, order.

More data for an enhanced Automated Targeting System (ATS). The Subcommittee states that an effective cargo security risk assessment screening system will require obtaining more complete cargo shipment data than is used today; i.e., enhance the Automated Targeting System (ATS). The Subcommittee notes that the government increasingly acknowledges that the existing targeting data is not adequate. A "blueprint" needs to be developed identifying what additional data should be obtained, from whom, and when.

One specific Subcommittee recommendation is for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to require importers to file eight data elements at least 24 hours before vessel loading, just like the advance bill of lading data filing by carriers in AMS under the "24 hour rule."

(The full COAC states that it recommends a somewhat different approach. While it does not disagree with the Subcommittee's assertion that additional shipment data could assist the targeting process, it does not support identifying specific potential data elements at this time in the absence of more direction from the government as to the necessity of specific potential new data elements to meet the government's security needs. COAC notes that equally important is that any potential data elements be well-defined and the data source, provider, and system clearly understood.)

Move Container Security Initiative (CSI) beyond its development stage and make it more robust. The Subcommittee notes that this is essential and that there is no international regulatory entity, like the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for ships, to establish cargo security rules or screening or inspection protocols. CSI needs to move beyond its developmental stage and be made more robust. At the same time, CSI's role must be clearly understood. For example, it is convenient, but presumably not correct, for the government to say that in the event of security crisis, the U.S. will only allow commerce to come to the U.S. via a CSI port - as the CSI ports that are operational today account for only approximately 40% of U.S.' total containerized imports.

Criteria for "green laning" container cargo as low risk must be transparent. DHS, in consultation with industry, should establish clear, transparent criteria that the industry and government can understand and plan on for what is required for containerized cargo to be considered low risk or "secure" and entitled to expedited or "green lane" treatment, including if and when there is a security incident involving containerized cargo. The critical importance of the container stuffing process should be addressed in such criteria. The Subcommittee notes that this would also facilitate meaningful contingency planning.

According to the Subcommittee, one way to approach the issue of defining what is a "secure shipment" would be to consider what transparent, predictable criteria should result in containerized cargo shipments having assured security. It would appear necessary in such an effort to include criteria for what needs to occur at container stuffing in order to be provided "green lane" treatment, as that process is both beyond U.S. regulatory jurisdiction, and industry currently lacks clearly understood and enforced criteria. The Subcommittee provides various examples of categories of containerized cargo shipments (e.g., Categories A, B, and C) and the type of treatment (i.e., green lane or other) that they could be accorded.

Effective contingency planning in the event of a terrorist attack. According to the Subcommittee, this is the most serious issue. Addressing this difficult issue in a coherent and disciplined manner would offer the opportunity not only to create the ability to reduce economic damage to the American economy and global trading system in the event of a terrorist attack on or using a container, but address many of the problems outlined above - because it would force the government and industry to address important questions such as:

• What criteria will be used to determine what American trade will be allowed to be transported in the event of a security incident;
• What will the U.S. expect and require of foreign governments;
• What will be expected of carriers and marine terminals;
• What will be expected of shippers;
• What will be expected of CBP and what is its role;
• What will be expected of the Coast Guard and what is its role;
• Who will make what decisions; and
• How will that be communicated?

(¹ COAC's MTSA Implementation Subcommittee was formed at the request of DHS to advise it on the implementation of its obligations under MTSA in three areas of concern:

1. Performance standards for the physical security of intermodal containers;
2. Development and implementation of the "secure systems of transportation" mandate; and
3. Quantitative performance metrics to measure the success of specific DHS cargo security programs and to guide future efforts.)

The Subcommittee reported at the September 2004 COAC meeting that they were able to complete work (and issue this report) on only the first two (of the above three) areas of concern, to date.)

See ITT's Online Archives or 09/21/04 news, 04092110, for previous BP summary regarding the September 10, 2004 COAC meeting.

See ITT's Online Archives or 07/20/04 news, 04072020, for previous BP summary regarding COAC's MTSA Implementation Subcommittee.

COAC's MTSA Implementation Subcommittee report and full COAC committee comments available by emailing documents@brokerpower.com.